



ARE BUREAUCRATS BETTER LEADERS OF THE SOCIETY THAN THE POLITICALLY ELECTED ONES ?

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Abstract

After local elections have been held in Indonesia, the purpose of this work is to conduct an analysis of the rise of bureaucracy as a source of political power at the local level. The bureaucracy quickly develops into a political force that is able to compete with the other political powers at the local level. This transformation occurs as a result of information authorization, media networks, and stable structures. In the local elections held in Medan in 2010 and 2012, the dominance of bureaucracy networks was clearly demonstrated, and bureaucrat-background candidates were victorious in both years. The researcher conducted the study by holding a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and conducting an in-depth interview with 10 bureaucratic elites in Medan as well as local political elites. Both of these approaches were used as methodologies of the study. Typology, a method of qualitative analysis, is used to conduct the analysis of both the observation and the Focus-Group Discussion (FGD). According to the findings, the bureaucratic network in Medan has been exploited in a significant degree as a source of political power in order to achieve victory. Every level of the bureaucratic hierarchy, from the highest to the lowest, plays a part in determining who comes out on top. The majority of government initiatives were utilized in an effort to win over the support of the general public for the candidates. In order to conduct a campaign on a vast scale, the proximity of the bureaucracy to the media network is also utilized. The findings of the study indicate that in the context of the local election, bureaucracy manifests itself as a novel, huge, and powerful form of local political power.

keywords: Bureaucrats, society, politically

Introduction

Following the reformation, the application for regional autonomy has produced a significant influence on the development of political institutions in Indonesia. The Reformation resulted in a political constellation that was more democratic and dynamic than it had been in the past. This occurred both nationally and locally. One of these options is to establish direct local elections for the position of governor. The essence of people's sovereignty is expressed via the process of direct election. A strong political legitimacy may also be built up for the selected leader through the process of direct local election, which is another benefit. Direct local elections, on the other hand, give rise to a cutthroat level of competitiveness between political players in the region. This signaled the creation of a dynamic and variable electoral act structure of society, as well as the appearance of new political elites (entrepreneurs, civil-society practitioners, professors, and bureaucrats) who are increasingly autonomous from central power. In Indonesia, elections for the position of local governor have been held directly since the middle of the year 2004. This election saw the participation of a large number of government officials and bureaucrats. Since June 2005, the results of direct elections have shown that over 40 percent of them were won by participating bureaucrats. It might be difficult to tell the difference between bureaucracy and the process and action of politics. individuals who act politically are the participants in the

activities that take place in the political room. Political room activities consist of individuals behaving politically. Even if bureaucrats do not vote in elections or otherwise take part in actual politics, the government bureaucracy will be directly or indirectly tied to the many interest groups in society. This ensures that bureaucrats will constantly be in contact with the political sphere. Both Rahudman Harahap and Dzulmi Eldin are first-generation mayors, having won direct election during their respective terms (2010-2012 and 2012-2011). Both of them come from a bureaucratic background as performers. Rahudman Harahap and Dzulmi Eldin dominate the sources of bureaucracy formal force, domination of information source, domination of fund, and structural authority in the making of strategy policy throughout service. This is true internally as well. Moreover The control of society's players, as well as media networks and local elites, are all forms of political power that are utilized during elections. Other supporting elements, such as a bearer political party, campaign strategy, local elites, and political mobilization, are more likely to result in a reinforcement of owned political capital inside an organization. This enormous source of power inspired the author to conduct more in-depth research on the subject of how successful political strategies are implemented, how they connect to the structure of successful strategies, and how bureaucratic power may be transformed into political machines to win candidate pairs. It is necessary to have a well-measured, systematic, and appropriate political plan for winning in order to win an election. A political strategy is an overarching plan of action that is utilized during a campaign. In a nutshell, a strategy that is implemented in order to target a certain circumstance and is judged successful based on the results of a predetermined issue analysis [4]. According to Patrick J. Sellers, a political campaign is more of an application of art strategy than it is a demonstration of expertise in order to obtain votes. During a political campaign, the primary objective of a campaign is to win the sympathy of as many people as possible.

Xandra Kayden has said once again that political campaigning is a symbolic desire that is held by society in order to become a part of something. A campaign is a metaphor for gathering information about the feelings and desires of voters [6]. In the framework of the elections in Medan in 2010 and 2012, Rahudman Harahap and Dzulmi Eldin not only implemented a winning political strategy by utilizing party instruments and other party supporters, but they also made the most of the capabilities of elite bureaucracy and local elites in Medan. According to Lipset and Solari, elites are those who occupy a particular position at the very top of significant social structures. These people have high-ranking positions in institutions such as the government, the military, politics, religion, education, and the professions. This was said along with a remark from Czudnowski that elites are those who are arranging everything, or key players who operate as the major functional and organized actor in any institution, church, military, academic institution, industry, communication area, and so on [7]. Weber asserted that bureaucracy has a good meaning of orderly, structured, and neat organization in a tiered work connection and also has a procedure in an organizational arrangement. This is in addition to the fact that bureaucracy has a nature regarding the nature of bureaucracy.

WHY STUDY TOP BUREAUCRATS' CAREERS?

Because of their one-of-a-kind role as the connection between ministers and ministries, top bureaucrats have been the subject of research for more than a century. Due to the fact that senior bureaucrats are in a position to interpret and explain commands given by politicians to the bureaucracy—and to some degree, vice versa—the post has the ability to confer a great deal of authority. They were neither elected to their positions nor are they known to the general public, despite the fact that they are at the intersection of politics and administration. Instead, the minister currently in charge of the government makes appointments to senior bureaucratic positions. Studies have been conducted in an effort to account for their traits because of their privileged status.

In the beginning, researchers placed more of a focus on aspects of social background such as schooling or the father's employment (see, for example, Aberbach et al., 1981; Putnam, 1976). However, in recent years, researchers have begun to place more of an emphasis on the career path itself (see, for example, Bach & Veit, 2012; Veit & Scholz, 2012).

There are three reasons why it is vital to analyze the careers of top bureaucrats. To begin, it is essential to have a background understanding of the origins of senior bureaucrats given the fact that they are not democratically elected to the very powerful positions they hold. Second, certain ministries, often economic ministries, make it a priority to educate bureaucrats in order to "colonize others and to conserve [their] own values." This objective is typically driven by the desire to "conserve [their] own values." This might result in certain forms of logic taking precedence over other types of reasoning. For example, if the bulk of the bureaucrats working in the Ministry of Education had their training in the Ministry of Finance, then an economic logic may come to eclipse the pedagogical logic when it comes to preparing policy briefs. The same is true when looking at experience gained from the private sector; however, managers in the private sector and those in the public sector have quite distinct skill sets. As a result, the career routes taken by senior bureaucrats might provide insight into the ideals and competence that they uphold or lack. Third, it is essential to research potential career options since the amount of experience and knowledge you bring to a position influences how well you perform (for example, Lewis (2008)).

The following research topic is the focus of this paper's investigation: How has the trajectory of careers for senior bureaucrats changed throughout time? A Weberian perspective of the career of a top bureaucrat as lifetime progress within a single ministry would indicate that ministries serve as cradles of power, where bureaucrats are taught to become top bureaucrats. A Weberian understanding of the career of a top bureaucrat as lifelong advancement within a single ministry. Despite this, there is evidence from a number of different events indicating the career pathways of senior bureaucrats have gotten more complicated. First, as a result of a variety of ministerial changes, lifelong tenure is becoming less prevalent, which means that senior bureaucrats do not have the same level of job security as they formerly did. Second, ever since the New Public Management (NPM) principles were popular in the 1980s and 1990s, there appears to be an increasing interest in appointing private sector managers to jobs in the public sector. This is in contrast to the situation in the 1970s and 1980s, when the opposite was true. Because senior bureaucrats may no longer have lifetime careers inside the bureaucracy, this may have a number of ramifications for the competencies of top bureaucrats, including a reduction in their level of professional, technical, and procedural competency (*fachwissen*) and knowledge (*dienstwissen*). Because of this, the study of careers is crucial because it may tell us how to prioritize different kinds of knowledge and about the function of senior bureaucrats.

When researching the career paths of senior bureaucrats, also known as the highest-ranking career official in a ministry, I take a view that spans a century's worth of time. The legislative structure of Denmark is studied in detail and utilized as an illustration since it is used as a case study. The organization of ministerial departments in Denmark is quite similar to that of ministerial departments in countries such as the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden. This typical ministerial structure consists of a hierarchy consisting of a permanent bureaucracy with a political leader at the top of the hierarchy.

I compiled a list of all of the career paths taken by Danish permanent secretaries between the years 1925 and 2011 in order to create a dataset. The career trajectories are studied using sequence analysis, which enables a comprehensive perspective of career patterns since the method takes into consideration jobs, the order in

which they are held, as well as the length of time spent in each position. The careers of members of parliaments and court judges have been studied in the past using this methodology; however, the careers of senior bureaucrats have not been studied using this methodology.

I have identified five main career trajectories of senior bureaucrats, all of which I believe have gotten increasingly diversified over the course of time. For example, a smaller percentage of senior bureaucrats are now permanent secretaries after having spent the most of their careers working in the ministry in which they currently serve in that capacity. Concurrently, interministerial shifts throughout time have grown, and there are separate career pathways for people who worked primarily in the Ministry of Finance (MoF) or the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) prior to becoming a permanent secretary in another ministry. This is the case even though interministerial shifts have increased overall. In addition, those courses of professional development offer the quickest route to the top. One possible path to take in one's professional life is one in which the majority of one's job experience is gained from outside of the ministries, more especially from other sectors of the public sector. These individuals, known as outsiders, often occupy the job of permanent secretary for a shorter amount of time compared to their colleagues who have mostly served in the central administration. I've noticed an increase in the number of high-ranking bureaucrats who have expertise that provides them with political skill. Last but not least, I've seen that the job of permanent secretary, which was formerly considered the pinnacle of one's career, is increasingly being used as a steppingstone these days.

WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW ABOUT TOP BUREAUCRATS' CAREERS

Top bureaucrats are appointed rather than elected and shun the spotlight. Top bureaucrats are crucial because they link politics and administration. They have power because they shape policy that impacts everyone. Performance and bureaucrat experience are connected. According to Lewis (2008, pp. 184–189), US bureau heads who worked in the agency before becoming bureau chiefs perform better. Top bureaucrats impact choices and have been connected to performance, therefore we need to know more about their careers.

Have examined senior public servant careers. Career trajectories have been investigated in relation to politicization since they provide distinct signals to politicians about one's desire in a political position in the future Few have examined their job paths. This research examines career pathways to top bureaucracy and whether they evolve over time. The literature discusses whether senior bureaucrats should rise inside one ministry or numerous ministries From bureaucrat literature, I'll derive five career hypotheses for senior bureaucrats.

Weber's ideal has long established bureaucratic norms. The Weberian ideal is impractical, although many official papers and descriptions of bureaucrats seem to start with it. the ideal bureaucracy is a hierarchical system where bureaucrats are subject to politicians and should faithfully follow politicians' ideas without considering personal preferences. Bureaucrats should supply competence. Bureaucratic organizations are technically superior because “[p]recision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs are raised to the optimum point” Weber recommends some bureaucrat traits for optimal bureaucracy. First, officials should be employed meritocratically—no nepotism or favoritism. Second, bureaucrats must be politically neutral so politicians can trust them to carry out political choices regardless of their party affiliations. This is especially essential because the third criteria, that bureaucrats should have lifetime tenure, implies that they are set for a career

inside the hierarchical system, picked for promotion by superior authorities (Weber, 2000). With lifelong tenure and factual and procedural understanding, one ministry would dominate professional choices.

NPM, like Weber's ideal, distinguishes between policy-making and daily operations, emphasizing the minister's hands-off role in administration discusses the Managerial Bargain in his Public Service Bargains (PSB) study. PSBs are "any explicit or implicit understanding between (senior) public servants and other actors in a political system over their duties and entitlements relating to responsibility, autonomy and political identity, and expressed in convention or formal law or a mixture of both" Reward, competency, and loyalty determine PSBs. While there are endless PSB possibilities, the literature often contrasts the Schafferian bargain (trust, meritocratic hiring, permanent employment, politically neutral bureaucrat, politician are responsible and accountable), the managerial bargain (more autonomy to bureaucrat, higher wage, can be held accountable, and serves as lightning rod for politician), and the hybrid bargain (something in between the aforementioned two than managerial bargains. The dominant PSB has changed over time in various nations, including and Denmark PSBs have moved farther from Weberian bureaucrats and bureaucracy, whether the movement is little or large. Bureaucrats no longer have lifelong tenure or advancement Bureaucrats may leave their ministries after losing lifelong tenure. Hypothesis 1: Over time, fewer top bureaucrats will rise via one ministry.

Inspired by the commercial sector, the managerial bargain emphasizes management discretion and strategy Top bureaucrats worldwide receive more managerial training Private and public sectors offer managerial training. Hypothesis 2 predicts: Top bureaucrats with non-ministry experience will rise.

Due to the focus on dienstwissen, or "growing out of experience in the service," working outside the ministries may not be enough to become a top bureaucrat Fachwissen—technical knowledge—was Weber's fundamental requirement for bureaucrats. Weber's attitude toward client-handling bureaucracy, a downward direction in the hierarchy, explains this. claim bureaucrats are upward-oriented. Thus, Mangset and Asdal argue that dienstwissen is more significant than fachwissen, making it less vital to learn fachwissen and grow in one ministry. Instead, the authors emphasize the necessity of ascending the central administration career ladder, which gives bureaucrats the dienstwissen and power they need to advance. In the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium, reforms or institutional changes have made it easier, more likely, or mandatory to switch ministries during one's career. Hypothesis 3: Over time, more senior bureaucrats will rise from many ministries.

Research Method

This study was carried out using the qualitative method since its purpose was not just to describe a variable, symptoms, or situation as it is and was not intended to test any hypotheses. The documents that are pertinent to the topic are utilized as research materials, and in-depth interviews with relevant resources were also conducted to supplement this data. In addition to that, a focus group discussion was also carried out in Medan with elites from the bureaucracy, elites from political parties, as well as youth and public personalities. An analysis-descriptive technique is a problem solver that investigated by describing or portraying a topic or research object (person, institution, society, etc.), at this moment based on the observable facts or as it is. In other words, it investigated by describing or portraying a subject or research object as it is. The descriptive technique has two distinguishing characteristics: first, it places primary emphasis on the issues that arose in the course of the study or the real issues; second, it describes the facts of the examined issues in their current state while also providing a reasonable interpretation of those facts.

Result and Discussion

The technique that Rahudman Harahap used to win in 2010 and Dzulmi Eldin used to win in 2012 is actually not that dissimilar to the strategy model and form that candidate pairs use to win elections in general. But the most interesting aspect of this pair's winning plan was the huge supports and involvements of the bureaucracy elite majority in Medan at every winning stage. This meant that society and other elites' backing was strengthened. In the setting of the elections that are taking place now, bureaucracy has a tendency to demonstrate political activities that have taken the duties of bureaucracy in the new order (Orde Baru). According to Chusnul Mar'iyah, non-democratic activities are just as prevalent in today's electoral setting as they were under the Soeharto administration. The transformation of a centralized process into a decentralized one does not immediately result in a shift in the roles played by political players on a national or local scale in the context of electoral manipulation. In the context of elections, the pattern of manipulation carried out nationally by political players and carried out by bureaucrats at the regional level is identical to the tactics carried out during the New Order. According to the book Castles, the term "bureaucracy" refers to the relationship that exists between a client and a patron, as well as the relationship that existed between the gentry and the proletariat in the old Java kingdom. In addition to that, the bureaucracy in Indonesia possesses a big authority and is unmanageable; this is because the bureaucracy possesses an excessive amount of power. That will make it difficult to prevent any kind of abuse or misuse. Therefore, it is quite conceivable that political behaviors that occur in bureaucracy primarily occur when the bureaucracy elite in one region become candidates of the election. This is a very plausible hypothesis. It is impossible to deny the fact that during the election, the bureaucracy in one region was coopted by the interests of elites. The bureaucracy should ideally become a tool for the governor to employ in order to succeed the government. In addition to this, the bureaucracy is frequently used as the most effective political machine in order to win elections for the incumbent pair. In the subsequent phase, regional elites who already possess formal authority fight with one another to exploit the bureaucracy as a political machine. This has the potential to produce implications to an unhealthy bureaucracy order and regeneration inside, as well as implications to non-democratic elections outside.

In the elections that took place in Medan in 2010 and 2012, bureaucratic elite power became a key component in every winning action package. The bureaucratic elites, beginning with the head division, head district, and head village, all provided important assistance, either directly or indirectly. This could be traced back to the beginning of the political campaign all the way to the enormous mobilization that took place during the campaign and the vote. The management of data and information networks was one of the factors that contributed to the rise of bureaucracy as a powerful institution. By data, we mean those connected to the number of people and characteristics of individuals in a certain region, public figures in the area ranging from villages to districts, and also which channels people use in order to acquire information. The required data have been obtained in their whole by the bureaucrat through the appropriate governmental institutions, district offices, and village offices. In order to ensure that the resources controlled by those bureaucrats from Head division, Head districts, and even Head village were sufficient to support a method of election victory that is based on data and information in the present day, Head division was divided into Head districts. In addition to this, Medan's government support system, known as the Head of neighborhood (Kepala Lingkungan), is among the most decentralized in all of Indonesia. These Head of neighborhood positions are physically located under the Head of village positions. With a total of 2004 personnel spread among 151 villages, the heads of neighborhoods in Medan have been organized to take on the role of government officers, going door to door

in their respective communities to interact with residents. Additionally, the leader of the neighborhood was given a key function as one of the information providers relating to the status of the society in which he was tasked. In addition to this, the information network and data validity obtained from the bureaucrats become one of the factors in the process of developing an efficient and effective strategy for winning. This includes the mapping of total voters in each voting station, the mapping of sung candidate supporters basis or supporters of other candidates, the mapping of voting witnesses in each voting station, etc. In this context, the use of networking information and data through this administrative network may also be termed an alternate source of communication and information, in addition to any sources that are formally held by political parties. In point of fact, the material possesses a higher level of veracity in addition to a more comprehensive aspect. In addition to making it easier for citizens of Medan to obtain data and information, these bureaucrats have the responsibility of reaching out to all of the local mass media, particularly the printed media, in order to promote any beneficial qualities that may be shared by the candidates for office. The bureaucrats have been granted direct access to, and convenience in utilizing, the desired facilities in connected media as a result of the strong relationship that exists between the elites and the owner of the local mass media as a result of institutional collaboration. In this particular instance, a power accumulation has arisen between politicians in supportive parties and bureaucratic elites working inside the context of the Medan administration. As a result, the local authorities, religious figures, public figures, and media figures may be readily controlled as desired.

Conclusion

According to the findings of this study, since the reformation, the bureaucracy has become more powerful as a local political machine, particularly in local elections. The candidate with a background in bureaucracy was able to effectively mobilize the bureaucracy machine and also conducted a method of political campaigning and political movement that was supported by elite bureaucrats network as the primary power for the entire winning activity and received significant support from local political elites.

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